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www.carjonline.orgIt would be convenient to say that the US health care
system is a reflection of the character of the American
peopleddiverse, creative, entrepreneurial, ‘‘can do.’’ It is not
that simple. In point of fact, there is no US health care
system. Rather, the organization, financing, and delivery of
our medical care are a patchwork that has grown over time
and in response to temporal demands. In not having a clearly
defined, integrated health care system, the United States is
unusual among developed countries. That this is the case has
implications for the American populace, which I will address
in this article. My goal is to provide insight to Canadian
radiologists, which may help them to evaluate their own
system of care in the context of another.
At the second annual American College of Radiology
Forum, an event drawing together multidisciplinary experts
on a selected topic, then National Quality Forum President,
Dr Kenneth Kiser, described what he called ‘‘the US health
care paradox’’[1]. The United States has an abundance of
highly trained practitioners, state-of-the-art technologies, and
unequaled health care spending. Despite this, care is difficult
to access, fragmented, unevenly distributed, and much of the
care provided is of uncertain value. As a result, he noted,
there is a ‘‘quality gap,’’ characterized by overuse, underuse,
misuse, and waste [1]. The Institute of Medicine has
concluded that simply tinkering with the current nonsystem
is insufficient to cure our problems and that sweeping change
is needed [2].
Dr Kiser’s indictments to the contrary, the majority of
Americans receive high-quality medical care. Nonetheless,
there is a growing consensus, to which I subscribe, that how
we deliver health care in the United States is flawed, such
that our society pays too much for its health care. The
continuing rate of increase in expenditures as a share of our
economy (16.3% of the gross domestic product in 2007) is
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considering both cost and benefit. There are various sources
of evidence that sustain these assertions. The following are
only a few of the many examples I might have chosen.
Despite spending double per capita of most developed
societies, the World Health Organization ranks the United
States in the midlevel of developed societies for such quality
indicators as life expectancy, infant mortality rate, and
overall care [3]. A 2007 Commonwealth Fund comparison of
US health care with the United Kingdom, New Zealand,
Australia, and Germany rated the United States as worst
overall and found the United States lagging in information
system infrastructure, ineffective in its expenditures, worst in
providing multidisciplinary care, and having by far the
highest administrative costs [4]. A research study evaluating
the performance of U.S. News and World Reports ‘‘Top 10
Hospitals’’ found up to 2-fold differences in expenditures
depending on the health system from which elderly patients
sought care for the last 2 years of their lives. Upon seeing
this result, one health economist, Uwe Reinhardt, exclaimed,
‘‘How can the best medical care in the world cost twice as
much as the best medical care in the world?’’ [5]. Indeed, the
same group of Dartmouth University researchers who con-
ducted that study has shown repeatedly that there are large
differences in the volume of services provided across
different geographic locales, explainable principally by the
available capacity of services. The greatest variation is for
services for which there is the lowest evidence basis for their
use (imaging among them). In the patois of economists, as
regards American health care, supply (and not necessarily
patient need) induces demand. There is nothing in the
Dartmouth group’s research to suggest that the regions with
higher utilisation and cost of services enjoy better health.
Why Americans are susceptible to such high and variable
health care expenditures almost certainly is multifactorial.
Despite a century of scientific medicine, most US physicians
eschew evidence-based guidelines in favor of habit, anec-
dote, and the advice of questionable sources (pharmaceutical
vendors are especially influential). In fact, the evidence basisAll rights reserved.
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deal of marginal and inappropriate care still can be ratio-
nalized. More than most countries, the United States has
great availability of advanced technology, some would say to
the point of excess capacity in some locales (ie, supply-
induced demand). Few states regulate the dissemination of
new technology to any significant degree. State laws also rule
in the venue of medical malpractice, and these laws vary
a great deal, introducing variability in physicians’ suscepti-
bility to practicing defensively. It is hard to estimate the true
cost contribution of the defensive use of diagnostic tests and
treatments, but fear of legal liability probably does drive
substantial wasted care. Perhaps most significantly, the moral
hazard of employer-based insurance (the dominant source of
private US insurance) and the incentives of a fee-for-service
system that align patients’ desires to receive more care with
physicians being paid more the more services they provide
converge to motivate the greater provision of care even in
circumstances in which more care may not be beneficial or
may even produce harmful effects.
What makes change difficult is that, even allowing for
these flaws and occasional polls showing mixed levels of
satisfaction with care, many fear the uncertainty over how
real change would affect the substantial number of Americans
who now easily and promptly access medical care. Those are
the individuals who have good employer-based or govern-
ment-provided insurance. Other powerful elements of the US
system also have an aversion to change. Physicians are well
compensated compared with the salaries earned by physicians
elsewhere. After a period of decline, hospitals once again are
making money. Insurance companies enjoy a powerful and
profitable position. However, the patchwork nature of
American health care financing leaves a substantial number
(currently estimated at 47 million) of US citizens and resi-
dents uninsured and with no traditional access to care. This is
not to say they receive no care. Rather they must stand in line
at the doors of local hospital emergency rooms and clinics.
Many more have minimal insurance coverage incapable of
protecting them from the disaster of medical bankruptcy. As
a result, perhaps as much as a third of the US populace may
receive less than optimal care later in the course of disease
than might be ideal. Institutions are strained by the demands
of providing so much uncompensated care.
Employer-Based and Federally Funded Health
Insurance and the Current Reimbursement System
To sum up the previous section, I believe we in the United
States receive too little value for our health care expenditures.
To say it another way, we spend more than we should, given the
service and benefit we receive, relative to other developed
societies. To me, the fundamental problem is the skewed
financial incentives proffered by our employment-based
insurance system of funding medical care and the govern-
mental insurance programs for the poor and elderly (Medicaid
and Medicare, respectively). It is worth taking a moment to
examine how these financing systems developed.Although private health insurance could be obtained in the
United States as early as the 1930s, this was not the general
practice. Health care mostly was delivered on the basis of cash
or even barter transactions, often according to individual
negotiations between the physician and the patient. After
World War II, at a time when many countries were developing
centralized health care systems, the United States was going in
another direction. The American Medical Association (AMA)
used the power it had earned through the mutual involvement
of doctors and their patients to stall any national health
insurance program, arguing that it represented the onset of
much-feared ‘‘socialism’’ [6]. At the same time, however,
employers increasingly began to offer health insurance as
a benefit to attract scarce labor in a booming economy. The
incentives promoting health insurance as a benefit of
employment were profound. Employees received an assurance
of care, and Internal Revenue Service regulations did not
require workers to pay taxes on the benefit as they would if the
same dollars were paid to them as wages. Employers could
deduct their contributions from revenues as a business expense
and thereby decrease their tax liability as well. Employer-
based health insurance disseminated rapidly, such that by
1965, greater than 70% of workers were covered [6]. That left
mainly the people who needed health care the most, the old and
the poor, without insurance.
In 1961, John Kennedy entered the White House
promoting a national plan to finance health care for the
elderly and indigent. In a famous battle of nationally tele-
vised speeches that drew the attention of much of the TV-
owning American populace on successive nights, Kennedy
debated the AMA’s President, Dr. Edward Annis, who again
called on Americans to defeat what his organization
considered the march towards socialized medicine. In a close
Senate vote several months later, Kennedy lost. Still, the die
had been cast. President Lyndon Johnson, buoyed by an
overwhelming electoral mandate, won passage of Medicare
in 1965. The political wrangling required to pass the legis-
lation extracted a high cost. Hospital payments (Medicare
Part A) would be on a cost-plus basis; this meant the more
a hospital spent to provide care, the more it would be paid.
Coverage for physician services (Medicare Part B and
Medicaid) would be on the basis of historical usual,
customary, and reasonable (UCR) fees. This meant that new
physicians entering a community could set their own (usually
higher) fees, initiating an inflationary spiral. Established
physicians advanced their fees to keep pace with the new
community standard. Both the hospital and physician
payment methodologies were fundamentally inflationary.
Inevitably, US expenditures for health care increased rapidly.
Although both cost-plus and UCR fees have long gone the
way of the dodo bird, inflationary incentives still rule Amer-
ican health care reimbursement. For both public and private
insurance programs, the dominant approach to physician
payment is fee-for-service. Unlike almost any other purchase
of goods or services that an individual might contemplate,
insured US citizens are largely protected from the financial
consequences of seeking medical care by their insurance plans.
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forms of copayments and deductibles, although these recently
have begun to increase as employers seek to transfer some of
their rapidly increasing health care costs to patients. Moreover,
we Americans have been conditioned by mass exposure to the
media to believe that more care is better than less, high-tech-
nology care is better than low-technology care. Physicians are
fiscally incentivized to provide more services because the
greater the number of services they provide, the higher their
income. The convergence of physician and patient incentives
is quite powerful.
The pricing of specific physician services is fixed by
a system developed in the early 1990s to replace UCR: the
Resource-Based Relative Value System, which places all
physician services in the context of one another, valuing both
the professional component (for diagnostic radiology, the
interpretation) and the technical component (the use of
the equipment, technologists, consumables, and so forth) on the
basis of the resources required to provide the service. The
relative value of a service (stated in relative value units) is
multiplied by a dollar factor and the result is modified for local
economic conditions to arrive at a payment. New services are
incorporated into reimbursed practice through a Byzantine
system that establishes their relative value [7]. Newer and
technologically more complex services tend to be paid for at
higher levels, a practice that has led to admitted skews in the
reimbursement system. These faults in the Resource-Based
Relative Value System have induced some physicians to relin-
quish some of their long-established practices and adopt newer,
better-paying ones [8]. One example of this that is pertinent to
radiologists is the self-referral of high-technology medical
imaging procedures. Nonradiologist physicians increasingly
are acquiring computed tomography, magnetic resonance, and
positron emission tomography scanners and self-referring their
patients. This practice indisputably leads to higher rates of
referral than if the physicians were referring their patients to
radiologists [9,10], leading to the suspicion that many referrals
generate marginal or inappropriate scans. The financial incen-
tive is to bill the lucrative technical component. Most often, self-
referring physicians arbitrage the less well-paying interpreta-
tion of the studies (professional component) to radiologists.
Hospital inpatient services are reimbursed by using a less
inflationary approachdthe so-called Diagnostic-Related
Groups, wherein the payer provides a lump sum for an
episode of illness and consideration of the patient’s comor-
bidities (ie, how sick the patient is). Hospitals make money
when they provide care for less than they receive and lose
money when they do not. Thus, in the inpatient setting,
imaging represents a cost against the lump sum payment, as
opposed to revenue in the outpatient setting.
As of 2003 (very little has changed), roughly 50% of the
(then) $1.7 billion US health care bill was paid by taxpayers
through various federal programs: Medicare, 17%; Medicaid
and other programs for the poor, 16% (split between the
federal and state governments); taxpayer contributions to
federal employee health insurance programs, 6%; and other
federal programs (eg, Veteran’s Administration), 12%. Thefederal share of insurance spending is expected to increase
over the next 20 to 40 years as the large baby boomer
generation reaches the age at which they are entitled to
receive Medicare benefits. Another 30% of US expenditures
was paid by private insurance. Patients paid for 14% out of
their own resources. Charitable donations accounted for 5%.
Roughly 55% of all of these expenditures go to hospitals and
physicians, with pharmaceuticals accounting for another
11% (drugs may, in fact, have increased their share since
2003, since Medicare added a pharmaceutical benefit in
2005dMedicare Part D) [6].
One peculiarity of US health care expenditures bears
particular mention: administrative cost. Although small in
relative terms (2.2% of outlays for Medicare, 4.4% for private
plans [3]), American administrative costs are 2 to 3 times
higher than for other national health care systems and clearly
do not contribute directly to patients’ care or outcomes. The
pluralistic financing of our care is at the root of the problem.
Each insurer has its own mechanisms, forms, and rules for
reimbursement. The upshot is that seeking payment for
services is time consuming and expensive for providers.
Payment often is delayed or denied on the basis of an insurer’s
extensive code of operations, adding to providers’ frustrations.
Government health care financing programs and our
American attachment to employer-based insurance are
politically inflammatory entitlements. Any effort to tamper
with them requires great courage on the part of our corpo-
rations and legislators. This is why so little really important
change has occurred in a financing system now more than
a half century old. Nonetheless, there exists on the private
side of the equation a general concern among employers for
how health care’s ever-escalating costs are harming our
national economic competitiveness. Similarly, severe
concerns exist for the fiscal soundness of governmental
plans, particularly Medicare (the elderly are our most reliable
voting block). The expectation is that the Medicare program
will be bankrupt in the latter years of the next decade [11].
Our problems financing current levels of care make it all the
more difficult to address the issue of our uninsured. Progress
on implementing national health insurance for all Americans
will require a strong political will and the strength to face the
majority of insured Americans who might view covering the
uninsured as a potential ‘‘take away’’ from them.
Proposals for Change
As might be expected from the foregoing, the winds of
change are blowing. The avowed goal is to improve quality, but
in many cases this is transparently code for reducing cost.
Ideally, one would hope that the United States would focus on
value (the balance of cost and quality) to ensure high-quality,
efficient, integrated, and more equitably accessible care.
One idea that has gained popular currency, particularly
among employers, is a so-called market-based approach that
is focused on narrowing the information gap between
patients and providers that many economists believe prevents
health care from acting like other markets (needless to say
9B.J. Hillman / Canadian Association of Radiologists Journal 60 (2009) 6e10this is not the only feature of US medicine that is unmarket-
like). Referred to as consumerism, the idea is to provide
patients with greater information about both cost and quality
and let them decide which providers to trust with their
custom and at what price-point (ie, trading off considerations
of cost and benefit as they would any other product). The
patient’s incentive to do so would be for employers to
provide only a defined dollar benefit, beyond which the
patient would be responsible for the cost of seeking care, at
least until the cost reached a high (catastrophic) level.
Indeed, most employer-based plans already are increasing
the share of costs their workers bear and are beginning to
develop programs intended to disseminate information about
quality.
Clearly, the hard part of operationalizing consumerism is
to come up with and gather reliable data on meaningful
measures of quality. The Medicare program, in collaboration
with the AMA and various health care quality organizations,
has developed the Physician Quality Reporting Initiative
(PQRI). The purpose of the PQRI program is to develop
quality metrics for specific disease conditions and elements
of care pertinent to those conditions, and then to test the
performance of physicians for those circumstances. An
example of a PQRI metric pertinent to radiology is the
following.
 The percentage of final reports for computed tomography
or magnetic resonance imaging studies of the brain
performed within 24 hours of arrival to the hospital for
patients aged 18 years and older with either a diagnosis
of ischemic stroke or transient ischemic attack (TIA) or
intracranial hemorrhage or at least one documented
symptom consistent with ischemic stroke or transient
ischemic attack or intracranial hemorrhage that includes
documentation of the presence or absence of each of the
following: hemorrhage and mass lesion and acute
infarction [12].
At this time, participation in the PQRI is voluntary.
Participating physicians submit data and are paid an addi-
tional 1.5% bonus on all relevant procedures according to
whether they met the quality metric for an acceptable
number of cases over the course of the preceding year
(referred to generically as pay for performance, or P4P, in
health-speak parlance). There is some consideration of
making PQRI data submission a mandatory aspect of
participation in the Medicare program in the future. Similar
programs for hospitals have been in existence for some time
[13].
A second, much-discussed approach is the medical home,
which specifically addresses the fragmentation of US care
among organizationally unrelated specialists and the asso-
ciated high use of services and cost. As reflected in the recent
Commonwealth Fund study cited previously, because of the
point-of-service nature of most US medical practice, there is
poor integration of care. A patient may or may not have
a primary physician. Physicians refer patients to otherphysicians, frequently with poor follow-up evaluation of the
result. Most insurance plans allow patients to seek the care of
specialists directly. The result is, at best, inefficient care.
Worse, such lack of communication might harm patients.
The medical-home concept would assign patients to clinics
or physician groups that would take responsibility for better
organizing care. Groups would accept a lump sum payment
for providing usual care (as with our failed experiment in so-
called managed care of the 1990s), but might be eligible for
additional payments if there were a need for unusual care or
catastrophic events. Proponents of the medical-home concept
believe that coordinating care will improve quality and that
reintroducing capitated payments will alter physician
incentives to provide too much care (although perhaps
substituting an incentive to supply too little).
Ultimately, many policy makers believe that the only
effective way to address the high rate of provision of marginal
and inappropriate services is to redirect physician incentives
away from high-technology, procedural medicine towards
paying more for disease management and preventative health
activities. This is clearly what the Institute of Medicine had in
mind in its 2006 report when they wrote, ‘‘New payment
incentives must be created to encourage the redesign of struc-
tures and processes of care to promote higher values’’ [14].
General Electric’s (GE) benefits guru, Bob Galvin, said much
the same thing, but more dramatically, ‘‘Pay for performance is
like putting lipstick on a pig.The biggest win in 2006 was
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) increasing
payments for evaluation and management services (personal
communication, October 2006).’’ The notion of restructuring
incentives is potentially threatening to radiologists because
there are some in our Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (those who bring us Medicare and Medicaid) who
believe that many imaging services currently are overvalued,
particularly with regards to the technical component. They
believe that further lowering the technical fees paid for imaging
examinationsdas occurred devastatingly as part of the 2005
deficit reductiondwill dramatically reduce the rate of increase
they are experiencing with imaging use and cost, which
currently outstrips general medical inflation by 3-fold to 8-fold,
depending on the imaging modality [15].
Summary
US health care providers have prospered under a virtual
calico cat of financing, organizational, and delivery
approaches that provide social and financial incentives to
deliver too much care at too great a cost. Although the
majority of the US populace has good access to high-quality
health care, the citizenry, their employers, and governments
pay too much for the benefit received. A significant number
of people have poor access to providers and receive less-
than-timely care because they have no health care insurance
or because their level of insurance requires that they share
the cost of care beyond what they can afford (ie, are
underinsured). Given the increase in expected lifespan, the
chronic ailments that accompany advancing age, and the
10 B.J. Hillman / Canadian Association of Radiologists Journal 60 (2009) 6e10demands of baby boomers that their anticipated entitlements
provide them with enhanced quality of life, there should be
a greater sense of urgency among both private and public
policy makers to address the inefficiencies and inadequacies
of our current nonsystem of medical care.
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